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Introduction 
The major developed countries abandoned the 
Bretton Woods system of fured exchange rates in 
March 1973 in favor of a system of more general- 
ized floating rates. Over the 13 years since the 
adoption of floating exchange rates, however, 
governments generally have refused to allow the 
private market fiee rein in determining the 
foreign-exchange values of their currencies. They 
fiequently have intervened in the foreign- 
exchange market to influence outcomes. The fie- 
quency and intensity of  intervention has varied 
greatly over the years and among the countries. 
Most noticeable has been a sharp reduction in 
the intervention activity of the United States since 
early 1981. This reduction reflected a growing 
realization that exchange-market intervention, 
conducted independently  of monetary policy, 
had only a limited effect on exchange rates. 
Economic theory suggests three 
possible channels through which exchange- 
market intervention could alter exchange rates: 
the monetary channel, the portfolio-balance 
channel, and the expectations channel. The 
monetary channel allows intervention to influ- 
ence exchange rates by altering the relative 
growth rates of  nations' money stocks. There is 
little disagreement about the potency of such 
intervention; in fact, central banks can maintain 
fured exchange rates through relative changes in 
their money stocks. 
Central banks, however, have 
sought a means to influence exchange rates 
independent of their monetary policy. Portfolio- 
balance models of exchange-rate determination 
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offer such a channel. According to this approach, 
intervention that alters the relative stock of 
domestic and foreign currency denominated gov- 
ernment debt could influence exchange rates in a 
manner consistent with the objectives of the inter- 
vening monetary authority. The portfolio model 
seemed to offer support for fiequent intervention 
as conducted during the 1970s by the United 
States. Although not conclusive, subsequent 
empirical work has cast doubt on the ability of 
central banks to influence exchange rates through 
the portfolio-balance channel. This research, 
however, has left open the possibility that inter- 
vention can influence exchange rates by provid- 
ing new information to the exchange market. In a 
highly efficient market, however, the instances 
when the monetary authority has better informa- 
tion than the market are few. The belief that 
intervention operates largely through the expecta- 
tions channel forms the basis for the limited use 
of intervention by the United States in the 1980s. 
Recent attempts to encourage an 
orderly depreciation of the dollar fiom its record 
levels in exchange markets have renewed interest 
in the feasibility of h-equent exchange-market 
intervention. Consequently, this article surveys 
the literature on intervention for readers who are 
not necessarily specialists in international finance. 
After providing a definition of intervention and a 
discussion of why countries intervene, we focus 
on the theoretical channels through which inter- 
vention might alter exchange rates. Box 1 pro- 
vides a bibliographic guide to many of the empir- 
ical studies on intervention. 
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I.  A Definition 
Exchange-market intervention refers to official 
purchases and sales of  foreign exchange, which 
nations undertake to influence the exchange value 
of their currencies. This definition describes inter- 
vention in terms of two criteria: the types of trans- 
actions and the motives guiding those transactions. 
The distinction among various 
types of  transactions is important because coun- 
tries have many policy levers with which to affect 
the exchange value of their currencies. They can 
alter monetary and fiscal policies, institute broad 
or selective capital controls, or resort to various 
trade barriers. Almost any government policy can 
have exchange-rate repercussions in a floating 
exchange-rate regime with a high degree of  inte- 
gration among nations' capital and goods 
markets. The purchase and sale of foreign 
exchange, however, is the most direct and most 
flexible lever through which to affect exchange 
rates. It is, therefore, the most frequently used 
intervention device. 
Usually a nation's central bank or 
exchange-stabilization fund conducts its interven- 
Some Empirical Studies 
of  Intervention 
Argy (1982) investigates the profita- 
bility of intervention by Japan, West 
Germany, and the United Kingdom, 
emphasizing the need to adjust for 
the accumulation or diminution of 
foreign-exchange inventories. He 
finds mixed results, depending on 
the time period chosen and on the 
specific country. 
Bagshaw and Humpage (1986) find 
that the decision to cease systematic 
intervention from April 1981 to 
March 1982 generally had no effect 
on the volatility of exchange rates, 
as measured by the parameters of a 
stable Paretian distribution. 
Danker, Haas, Henderson, et 
a1.(1983) investigate intervention by 
Germany,  Japan, and Canada using 
monthly and quarterly data in a 
portfolio-balance model that differ- 
entiates between bank and nonbank 
demands for bonds, and which 
incorporates rational and static 
expectations. 
Greene (1984a) argues that inter- 
vention from January to March 1975 
successfully broke a string of almost 
continuous declines in the dollar. 
The studies seems to illustrate the 
importance of coordinated 
intervention. 
Greene (1984b) suggests that inter- 
vention, although effective on cer- 
tain occasions, could not over- 
whelm the influence of market 
fundamentals and sentiments 
promoting a rapid dollar deprecia- 
tion from September 1977 to 
December 1979. 
Greene (1984~)  investigates inter- 
vention from October 1980 to Sep- 
tember 1981. She does not find 
strong evidence of an increase in 
exchange-rate volatility after the Unit- 
ed States ceased intervention in Feb- 
ruary 1981. 
Humpage (1985) constructs a daily 
time-series model of U.S. interven- 
tion (November 1, 1978 to October 
31, 1979) suggesting the United 
States attempted to smooth unantic- 
ipated exchange-rate movements 
but found no evidence of the 
expected exchange-rate response. 
Hutchison (1984) develops a 
portfolio-balance model of Japanese 
intervention and concludes that Jap- 
anese intervention would need to 
be massive to affect the yen-dollar 
exchange rates appreciably. 
Jacobson (1983) calculates the prof- 
itability of U.S. intervention, show- 
ing the problems of evaluating 
inventories of foreign exchange. The 
results are mixed. 
Loopesko (1983) tests for a system- 
atic relationship between interven- 
tion and unexploited interest arbi- 
trage profits, using daily data on six 
major currencies against the dollar. 
About half the cases do not support 
a portfolio-balance channel. 
Mayer and Taguchi (1983) investi- 
gate the profitability of German,  Jap- 
anese and British intervention, 
emphasizing the need to adjust for 
interest earnings on foreign 
exchange reserves. They develop a 
rule for assessing a leaning-against- 
the-wind intervention strategy. 
Pippenger and Phillips (1973) find 
that Canadian intervention during 
the Canadian float (1952 to 1960) 
reduced day-to-day fluctuations in 
exchange rates; the study uses daily 
data and spectral analysis. 
Rogoff (1984) investigates Canadian 
intervention within a portfolio- 
balance hmework with weekly 
data, but finds no evidence that 
intervention operates through this 
channel. 
Taylor (1982a, 1982b) calculates the 
profitability of intervention by the 
major developed nations under 
floating rates and finds that nearly 
all countries experienced losses 
over the period. For many countries, 
and for the group as a whole, the 
probability of experiencing similar 
large losses through random inter- 
vention was very small. 
Tryon (  1983) provides a review of 
empirical models of intervention 
that utilize the portfolio-balance 
framework 
Wilson (  1982) discusses the empiri- 
cal difficulty of making profit 
comparisons. 
BOX  1 
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tion. Some governments occasionally have 
directed banks and public or private corporations 
to carry out exchange-market transactions and 
have subsidized such transactions (see Jurgensen 
[I9831  ). Although difficult to identify, these trans- 
actions constitute intervention. 
Central banks can intervene in 
either the spot-or forward-exchange market. 
Because covered interest arbitrage links the spot 
and forward markets, intervention in either 
market could affect both exchange rates. Most 
central banks, however, show a preference for 
spot-market intervention.' 
An understanding of the motives 
for buying or selling foreign exchange is a neces- 
sary component of the definition of  intervention. 
While all official purchases and sales of  foreign 
exchange place pressure on exchange rates, this 
is not always the purpose of such transactions. 
Central banks often buy or sell foreign exchange 
for customers, usually the home-country govern- 
ment, which otherwise would undertake the trans- 
actions through normal commercial channels. 
The home-country government might use the 
funds to repay official foreign-currency debts or 
to purchase military equipment. Central banks 
also buy foreign currency to build up or to 
replenish foreign-currency reserves. Sometimes 
central banks enter the exchange markets to con- 
vert interest payments on foreign reserves (which 
are paid in foreign currency) into domestic cur- 
rency. Such transactions would not seem to con- 
stitute intervention according to a strict interpreta- 
tion of our definition. 
Unfortunately, the distinction is 
not always very clear. Adams and Henderson 
(1983) discuss this issue and note that such trans- 
actions often constitute a type of "passive inter- 
vention." Central banks can conduct commercial 
transactions in a manner consistent with the over- 
all aims of their intervention policy. Adams and 
Henderson favor a broader definition of interven- 
tion and would characterize a transaction as inter- 
vention if it altered the currency composition of 
assets in the hands of  the public from that which 
otherwise would have resulted had all transactions 
occurred through normal commercial channels. 
11.  Sterilized and Nonsterilized Intervention 
Central-bank intervention in foreign-exchange 
markets can be sterilized or nomteriilized2 Steril- 
ized intervention refers to purchases and sales of 
The reluctance to intervene forward might reflect a fear that, if  1  the situation necessitating intervention persists at the time the 
forward contracts mature, a central bank could find that the volume of 
intervention necessary to defend its currency has increased greatly. 
Essentially, it must offset past pressures, as well as any new pressures. 
See  Tsiang (1959). 
foreign exchange whose impact on the home 
country's money stock is offset through domestic 
open-market operations. Nonsterilized interven- 
tion refers to purchases and sales of foreign 
exchange whose effects on the money stock are 
not offset by the home country's monetary 
authorities. If  sterilized intervention is effective, it 
gives the intervening country a policy tool, inde- 
pendent of monetary or fiscal policy, with which 
to alter the exchange rate; hence, the interest in 
sterilized intervention. 
The important distinction between 
sterilized and nonsterilized intervention is illus- 
trated in table 1, which presents a consolidated 
balance sheet for a hypothetical central bank. On 
the asset side of the ledger are net foreign assets 
(NFA), which consists of foreign reserves less lia- 
bilities to foreign official holders, and domestic 
assets (DA), which consists primarily of loans to 
depository agencies and government securities. 
On the liability side is the monetary base (MB), 
which consists of currency in the hands of the 
public and reserves in the banking system. Both 
sides of the ledger must balance. Consequently, 
the balance-sheet identity is: 
NFA  +  DA = MB. 
When a central bank intervenes in the exchange 
market, buying or selling foreign assets (NFA), 
two things happen: First, the composition of its 
assets changes; that is, NWDA rises or falls. 
Second, the monetary base changes by an 
amount equal to the change in net foreign assets; 
that is, AMB =  ANFA The change in the mone- 
tary base results fi-om the balance-sheet identity 
and leads to a multiple change in the domestic 
money stock. 
If  the change in the money stock 
resulting from intervention is not consistent with 
the central bank's domestic monetary-growth 
objectives, the central bank could offset (steril- 
ize) the effect on its money stock of a change in 
its net foreign assets. The intervention authority 
can sterilize intervention by buying or selling 
domestic assets through open-market operations, 
or by making loans to depository institutions 
through discount-window operations until: 
ANFA  =  -ADA 
Sterilized intervention involves only an asset- 
composition effect. It is a stronger asset- 
composition effect than nonsterilized interven- 
tion, because it involves changes both in net 
foreign assets and in domestic assets. Nonsteril- 
ized intervention involves both an asset- 
composition effect and a money-supply effect. 
Consequently, nonsterilized intervention is ana- 
I 
Adams and Henderson (1983), Batten and Ott  (1984), Genburg  2  (19811,  and Jurgensen (1983) also discuss the distinction between 
sterilized and nonsterilized intervention. 
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lytically indistinguishable from sterilized interven- 
tion, plus a change in monetary policy. 
Sterilized intervention can be com- 
plete or partial. Even when the home country 
sterilizes the impact of intervention on its currency 
unit for unit, the transaction can alter the money 
stock of  the foreign country whose currency was 
purchased or sold. The foreign country also can 
sterilize the impact of home country intervention 
on its money stock through the instruments of  its 
domestic monetary policy. In addition, either the 
home or the foreign government can elect not to 
offset intervention unit for unit. 
Monetary Authority's Balance Sheet 
Assets  Liabilities 
Net Foreign Assets (NFA)  Monetary Base (MB) 
Gold  Currency in hands of public 
Foreign currency  Reserves 
SDR 
Net position in IMF 
Domestic Assets (DA) 
Government securities 
Loans to depository institutions 
Other 
TABLE  1 
Many foreign countries lack money 
markets with sufficient breadth to offset interven- 
tion on a continual basis. Some sterilize through 
changes in their discount rate or their reserve 
requirements. Some, like Switzerland, use 
foreign-currency purchases and sales to execute 
domestic monetary policy. As long as countries 
attain their monetary objectives in the face of 
intervention, we can conclude that they have neu- 
tralized the monetary effects of  intervention (see 
Jurgensen [I9831  ). 
Completely sterilized intervention 
is analytically equivalent to a trade of public 
securities denominated in home-country currency 
for securities denominated in foreign-country 
securities. It results in a change in the currency 
composition of securities held by the public, the 
mirror image of which is a change in the cur- 
rency composition of assets held by the central 
banks. When the United States and Germany 
conduct completely sterilized intervention to 
support the dollar vis-a-vis the mark, for example, 
they reduce (increase) the amounts of U.S. 
government obligations held by the public (Fed- 
eral Reserve System) and increase (decrease) the 
amount of German government bonds held by 
the public (Bundesbank). 
111.  Why Do Central Banks Intervene? 
According to official publications, governments 
intervene to "calm disorderly exchange markets." 
Yet, no clear definition of what constitutes a dis- 
orderly exchange market exists, and the official 
perception of disorder seems to vary among cen- 
tral banks and over time. The experience with 
floating exchange rates, however, suggests two 
broad reasons for exchange-market intervention: 
First, exchange-rate movements can have impor- 
tant macroeconomic implications; nations have 
viewed intervention as a means of  influencing 
these movements independently of  monetary and 
fiscal policies. Second, governments view 
exchange markets as periodically inefficient, justi- 
fying market intervention. 
&change rates are the price of 
one nation's monetary unit in terms of another 
nation's monetary unit. They are endogenous var- 
iables; that is, exchange rates respond to changes 
in other economic variables such as monetary 
and fiscal policies at home or abroad. Because 
exchange rates are endogenous variables, one 
cannot easily ascribe causality to exchange-rate 
movements. The record appreciation of the dollar 
from 1980 to 1985, for example, seemed to 
reflect the huge increase in federal borrowing 
associated with the budget deficit. Was it then the 
dollar or the budget deficits that contributed to 
the deterioration in the trade balance since 1982? 
Nevertheless, policymakers often 
seem to view exchange-rate movements as exo- 
genous events. One possible explanation for this 
view is that developments in foreign countries, 
beyond the control of the home-country govern- 
ment,  can produce exchange-rate movements. 
From this perspective, exchange-rate movements 
appear responsible for altering the relative prices 
of goods, services, and financial assets in one 
country vis-a-vis other countries. These relative 
price changes can have important influences on 
real economic growth, employment, and prices 
in the aggregate national economy or in specific 
sectors. Consequently, despite the adoption of 
floating rates, nations have continued to regard 
exchange rates as important policy targets and, in 
vaqing degrees, have attempted to manage their 
exchange rates. From this perspective, central 
banks found intervention, especially sterilized 
intervention, interesting. It seemed to offer 
nations an "additional" policy variable with which 
to influence exchange rates, while leaving mone- 
tary and fiscal policy fiee to pursue domestic 
economic objectives. 
Monetary authorities have not 
taken this view to the extreme; that is, they have 
not attempted to peg an exchange rate with steril- 
ized intervention.3 Nor did they regard monetary 
policy as irrelevant in determining exchange 
rates. Nevertheless, policymakers appeared to 
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believe that through sterilized intervention they 
could influence the speed at which exchange 
rates adjusted. This view is evident in the fact that 
many central banks have intervened frequently, 
often following a strategy of leaning against the 
wind (see Jurgensen [I9831  ). 
Since the early 1980s and the find- 
ings of  the Jurgensen Report, the proposition that 
sterilized intervention offers an independent pol- 
icy lever with which to affect exchange rates has 
not found wide acceptance.  As the next section 
discusses more fully, the preponderance of 
research suggests that intervention probably has a 
very limited, if any, independent influence on 
exchange rates. Nevertheless, many policymakers 
believe that intervention, when undertaken in 
conjunction with other (monetary) policies, 
affords a market impact substantially greater than 
one would expect from the sum of  the two poli- 
cies taken independently. That is, intervention 
can augment monetary and fiscal policies. As the 
Jurgensen Report noted: 
... most members felt that the impact of the 
simultaneous application of the two instru- 
ments exceeded their individual effects. In 
other words, these members argued that 
exchange market intervention and mone- 
tary policy changes reinforced each other 
and thus enhanced the size and duration 
of  their respective effects (pp. 20-21). 
Extending this view, many argue that coordinating 
international monetary, fiscal, and intervention pol- 
icies also augments their individual effectiveness. 
The preceding discussion assumes 
that policymakers want to change the exchange 
rate in order to achieve some macroeconomic ob- 
jective; it also assumes that exchange markets are 
efficient. However, the second general reason for 
intervention is that policymakers regard exchange 
markets as not always efficient.  Because of inem- 
ciencies, exchange rates can become "mis- 
aligned" or exhibit excessive volatility or both. 
&change-rate misalignments and volatility can 
impose real resource cost on all nations, affecting 
economic growth, employment, and prices4  As 
the Jurgensen Report illustrates, monetary author- 
ities often have intervened to "dampen erratic 
fluctuation," to "calm disorderly markets," or to 
"keep exchange rates in line with fundamentals." 
All  these suggest that something is wrong with 
the market and that the monetary authority is 
capable of correcting the deficiencies. 
3 
The European Monetary System comes the closest to using inter- 
vention to peg an exchange rate. However, it is not clear that 
EMS intervention is routinely sterilized and therefore independent of 
monetary policy. 
14 
For  a discussion of  the effects of exchange-rate volatility, see 
International Monetary Fund (1984). 
IV. The Channels of Influence 
Economic theory offers three possible channels 
through which foreign-exchange-market interven- 
tion could influence exchange rates. First, non- 
sterilized intervention and, to a lesser extent, par- 
tially sterilized intervention alter the relative 
supplies of domestic and foreign money. These 
monetary shifts could affect relative interest rates, 
relative price levels, and exchange rates. Second, 
sterilized intervention alters the relative supplies 
of government interest-bearing debt held by 
international investors. Any resulting portfolio 
adjustments could affect exchange rates. Third, 
both sterilized and nonsterilized intervention 
could alter expectations in the foreign-exchange 
market. Exchange rates, like all asset prices, are 
very sensitive to changes in market participants' 
expectations. This section discusses each of these 
possible channels of  influence. 
A.  The Monetary Channel 
Economists have recognized a relationship be- 
tween changes in countries' monetary-growth rates 
and changes in their exchange rates (or balance 
of payments under f~ed  exchange rates) at least 
since Hume's price-specie-flow d~ctrine.~  Al- 
though international economists might disagree 
about the relevant time frame and relative impor- 
tance of money in exchange-rate models, few 
would object on theoretical grounds to the inclu- 
sion of money among the determinants of ex- 
change rates. Most recent models of exchange- 
rate determination either include relative money 
growth rates among their arguments, or represent 
the reduced form of  models whose structural 
forms include money.6 
Under classical assumptions of the 
neutrality of money and of the constancy of veloc- 
ity in the long run, a given percentage increase in 
a nation's money stock will result in a similar per- 
centage increase in that nation's price level. Given 
purchasing-power parity, that nation also will ex- 
perience a depreciation of  its nominal exchange 
rate equal to the percentage rise in its price level. 
The real exchange rate remains unaffected. 
While economists have challenged 
the strict versions of classical assumptions and 
have observed that purchasing power parity need 
not hold strictly even in the long run, the tenet 
that relative rates of money growth are important 
determinants of nominal exchange rates continues. 
In fact, one current approach to exchange-rate 
Keynesian economics did not emphasize the role of money in  5 balance-of-paymenis  adjustment problems; rather it focused on 
the elasticities approach and later the absorption approach. One  can 
trace the recent re-emphasis on money, at least, to Johnson (1968). 
I  6 
For  a recent survey of approaches to exchange-rate determination, 
see Schafer and Loopesko (1983). 
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determination, the monetary approach, views rel- 
ative patterns in the supply of and demand for 
nations' money as the key determinant of 
exchange rates? 
Modern approaches differ from his- 
toric treatments in that they allow for instanta- 
neous adjustment in asset markets through a 
rational-expectations framework, and they allow 
for sticky prices in goods markets. One important 
consequence of these assumptions is that the chan- 
nel of influence between monetary changes and 
exchange-rate movements does not necessarily run 
through relative prices and trade flows, as in the 
classical models. Modern approaches to monetary 
theory allow, at least in the short run,  for influ- 
ences of  money on interest rates, and exchange 
rates through an interest-rate parity mechanism. 
Contemporary models suggest that a change in 
relative monetary growth rates will produce both 
nominal and real exchange-rate changes in the 
short run,  but not in the long run.  Another impor- 
tant implication of modern models is that, follow- 
ing a monetary expansion, nominal exchange 
rates initially can overshoot their long-term equil- 
ibrium value (given by purchasing power parity) 
because of the slow adjustment in goods prices. 
The extent of  the overshoot will depend on all 
the interest elasticities and price elasticities 
embodied in the model. However, if goods prices 
adjust instantaneously, no exchange rate over- 
shooting will result.8 
Nonsterilized intervention, which 
changes nations' relative money supplies, has the 
potential to alter exchange rates rapidly and last- 
ingly. International economists rarely disagree 
with this proposition. Sterilized intervention,  as 
typically conducted by the United States, also 
could have an effect on exchange rates if foreign 
monetary authorities did not completely sterilize 
the transactions. 
As  indicated earlier, U.S. interven- 
tion to alter the dollar's exchange rate can change 
the money stocks of the nations whose curren- 
cies the Federal Reserve buys or sells, unless 
those nations take appropriate offsetting actions. 
The major developed countries, such as Germany 
and Japan, can sterilize the effect of foreign or 
domestic intervention on their money stocks. 
Smaller developed and developing countries 
often lack credit markets with suEcient  depth to 
undertake such sterilization activities on a routine 
basis through open-market operations. They can 
undertake reserve-ratio changes or discount-rate 
For  examples of  the monetary approach to exchange-rate deter- 
mination see Frenkel (1976) and Bilson (1978). 
1  8  The overshooting model is attributable to Dombusch (1916) 
changes, but these have a fairly dramatic impact 
on monetary growth and are not well-suited for 
routine adjustments to sterilized intervention. 
They do, however, provide a mechanism where- 
by the foreign central bank could offset the 
impacts of intervention over a longer period. 
B.  The Portfolio-Adjustment Channel 
Economists have extended the closed-economy, 
portfolio-balance models of asset demand, 
initially developed by Tobin (1958, 1969),  to the 
open-economy case. In a portfolio model of asset 
demand, risk-averse wealth holders, facing uncer- 
tain rates of return on an array of assets, diversify 
their portfolios across assets instead of holding 
only the single asset currently yielding the high- 
est rate of  return. When exchange risk and politi- 
cal risk are introduced into the model, a strong 
incentive exists for wealth holders to diversify 
their portfolios across curren~ies.~  The resulting 
demands for assets denominated in foreign cur- 
rencies affect exchange rates. The open-economy 
portfolio model illustrates an important channel 
through which completely sterilized intervention 
might affect exchange rates and the conditions 
that must hold for sterilized intervention to work. 
In a world with no transaction cost 
and no restraints on capital flows, arbitrage will 
equate returns on assets denominated in dollars 
with returns on assets denominated in other 
currencies: 
(1)  r=r*+f-s 
In equation 1, r is the log of the interest return 
on U.S. bonds and r* is the log of the interest 
return on foreign bonds. (We assume that the 
bonds mature in one year.) The forward exchange 
rate,  is the log of  the current dollar price of for- 
eign currency for delivery in one year. The spot 
price of foreign currency is s10 Assuming that 
domestic and foreign assets are perfect substi- 
tutes, so that the forward exchange rate equals 
the expected future spot exchange rate, arbitrage 
ensures that the return on domestic bonds, equals 
r*,  the return on foreign bonds, plus any capital 
gains associated with holding foreign-currency- 
denominated assets as exchange rates change. 
When wealth holders do not view 
domestic and foreign bonds as perfect substi- 
tutes, the forward exchange rate will differ from 
9 
Initial applications of portfolio models to the study of capital move. 
ments under fixed exchange rates are  Branson (1970), and Kouri 
and Porter (1974).  Early applications to floating exchange rates include 
Girton and Henderson (1977) and Kouri (1980).  Discussions of sterilized 
intervention within the context of portfolio models are found in Tryon 
(1983), Genburg  (1981), Henderson (1984), and Hutchison (1984). 
Equation 1 is the log form of  the covered interest-rate parity 
condition: 
(1  +  r) =  f/s  (I + r*) 
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mium, 8, that reflects the risks associated with 
holding an open position in dollars. That is: 
(2)  f -.f=  8. 
Substituting yields: 
(3)  r=P+(se-s)+8. 
As  can be seen from equation 3, wealth holders 
demand an extra return for holding the risky dol- 
lar asset above the interest return and expected 
appreciation from holding the foreign bond. (One 
could specify the problem with the foreign asset 
as the risky asset without affecting the analysis.) 
Rearranging equation 3 provides 
an expression for the risk premium: 
(4)  8=  r-  4 +  s-  se. 
With interest rates and the expected future value 
of  the dollar held constant, an increase 
(decrease) in the risk premium on dollar assets is 
associated with a depreciation (appreciation) of 
the dollar relative to the foreign currency. This 
depreciation of the dollar in the spot market is 
necessary to give wealth holders a capital gain 
over the holding period sd3cient  to compensate 
them for the additional risks of holding dollar- 
denominated assets. 
Before explaining intervention 
within the context of  this model, we should spec- 
ify the determinants of the risk premium. Under- 
lying the risk premium is the preference of  indi- 
viduals to hold assets in their home currency, an 
aversion to risk, and a desire to hold assets which 
maximize a return from a portfolio, given the 
risks. These risks include exchange risk (the 
uncertainty associated with unanticipated move- 
ments in exchange rates) and political risk (the 
probability that governments will impose future 
capital controls). In the case of major developed 
countries, most analysts attach greatest impor- 
tance to exchange risk (see  Dooley and Isard 
[l980] and Frankel [I9791  ). In specifying a func- 
tion to explain the risk premium, most research 
includes, among other terms, the ratio of domes- 
tic bonds to total wealth (see Frankel [1984, 
19791 and Hutchison [I9841  ). 
The assets relevant to the portfolio 
balance model are government bonds. Individu- 
als generally do not hold large balances of for- 
eign currency, since they would earn no interest. 
In addition, bondholders must view the bonds as 
additions to their net wealth. Private bonds are 
assets to lenders and liabilities to borrowers; 
therefore, they do not represent net additions to 
wealth. Government bonds will equal net addi- 
tions to wealth if  bondholders do not associate 
with an increase in government debt a future tax 
liability sufficient to retire the debt and all inter- 
est accrued on the debt (see Barro [I9741  ). 
The portfolio balance model pro- 
vides a channel through which sterilized inter- 
vention can alter exchange rates permanently 
since, as demonstrated earlier, sterilized interven- 
tion alters the relative supplies of domestic and 
foreign government bonds in the hands of  the 
public and, when the bonds are imperfect substi- 
tutes, alters the risk premium. Assume, for exam- 
ple, that the United States intervenes in the for- 
eign exchange market to support the dollar 
relative to the German mark The Federal Reserve 
buys dollars in the foreign exchange markets with 
German marks and sterilizes the intervention by 
buying Treasury bonds at the open-market desk. 
Assume that Germany also sterilizes by selling 
mark-denominated bonds. The Federal Reserve's 
purchase of Treasury securities initially creates an 
excess demand for Treasury securities that tends 
to lower U.S. interest rates, while the German sale 
of  mark-denominated bonds creates an excess 
supply and tends to raise German interest rates. 
Because U.S. and German bonds are not perfect 
substitutes, U.S.  bondholders are not willing to 
hold all of the excess supply of German bonds. 
The interest-rate movements tend to increase U.S. 
money demand and to lower German money de- 
mand. Yet, the money supplies in both countries 
have remained unchanged. With the expected 
future spot rate constant, the dollar will appre- 
ciate relative to the German mark."  The 
exchange-rate change, which occurs as money- 
demand shifts alter the terms of trade, is neces- 
sary to restore balance in both the money and 
bond markets. The appreciation of  the dollar rela- 
tive to the German mark reduces the attractive- 
ness of domestic bonds relative to mark bonds by 
increasing (decreasing) the expected future 
depreciation (appreciation) of the dollar relative 
to the mark, hence, it also reduces expected capi- 
tal gains on dollar assets. 
In terms of equation 4, therefore, 
intervention has produced movements in interest 
rates and the spot exchange rate associated with a 
reduction in the risk premium on dollar assets. 
The movement in the exchange rate, moreover, is 
compatible with the designs of the intervening 
monetary authorities. 
If  assets are perfect substitutes, 
wealth holders expect the same return from each 
bond. Under these assumptions, sterilized inter- 
vention will not affect the exchange rate, because 
individuals have no incentive to alter portfolios 
given a change in the relative stocks of bonds. 
Asset holders are perfectly willing to hold more 
mark-denominated bonds in place of dollar- 
I 
Analysts usually assume that long-term determinants, such  1  1  as purchasing power parity, or  a sustainable current account 
deficit, maintain the level of  se. 
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bonds are perfect substitutes, intervention also 
will leave interest rates unaffected because the 
intervention transactions, although altering the 
currency composition of bonds, have not changed 
the total value of bonds relative to money in port- 
folios. Wealth holders, therefore, have no incen- 
tive to diversify out of bonds and into money. 
Given the other assumptions men- 
tioned previously, the extent to which interven- 
tion alters exchange rates depends on the degree 
of substitutability between dollar-denominated 
and mark-denominated securities. Other things 
equal, if dollar and mark bonds are close substi- 
tutes, the change in the exchange rate will be 
small. If the assets are not close substitutes, a 
larger change in the exchange rate will be 
required to compensate for the risks. This implies 
that completely sterilized intervention might be 
feasible in some markets where assets are imper- 
fect substitutes, but infeasible in other markets, 
where assets are perfect substitutes.12 Therefore, 
the United States might intervene successfully 
against lira but not against marks. Clearly, one 
must evaluate the portfolio effects of completely 
sterilized intervention on a case-by-case basis. 
Empirical investigations to date 
generally do not find strong support for the con- 
tention that intervention affects exchange rates 
through a portfolio-adjustment mechanism (see 
box 1). Although the issue remains unresolved, 
the evidence of the existence of a risk premium 
between similar assets denominated in currencies 
of different major developed countries is mixed.13 
These investigations involve simultaneously test- 
ing the joint hypothesis that markets are efficient 
and that bonds are perfect substitutes. Conse- 
quently, a finding that the yield on domestic and 
foreign securities differs significantly from zero is 
subject to two interpretations. First, this result 
could indicate that assets are imperfect substitutes 
in an efficient market. Hence, intervention would 
work through the portfolio-balance mechanism. 
Second, and equally plausible, the finding could 
result if assets are perfect substitutes, but if 
markets are not perfectly efficient. This second 
finding suggests that intervention does not oper- 
ate through a portfolio-balance channel.14 
Loopesko (1983), Hutchison (1984) and Danker, 
See  Fukao (1985) for an interesting discussion of similar  1  2  problems with coordinated intervention wilhin the context of 
a portfolio-balance model. 
For  a survey, see Levich (1983). See also references to port- 
folio models in box  1. 
1 
This does not preclude the possibility that sterilized interven. 
tion could influence the exchange rate by improving market 
efficiency. 
Haas, Henderson et al. (1985) offer three investi- 
gations of intervention within the portfolio- 
adjustment !tamework. None finds strong support 
for the existence of a portfolio-adjustment  chan- 
nel for intervention. 
Even if  the relevant bonds are im- 
perfect substitutes, it appears that the response to 
small changes in the risk premium is quite low. 
Hutchison (1984) notes that changes in the 
cumulative total publicly held government debt is 
the relevant variable for the portfolio-adjustment 
model. Total government debt responds to inter- 
vention, to the surplus or deficit in the govern- 
ment budget, and to monetary policy. In his study 
of Japanese intervention, Hutchison (1984) sug- 
gests that intervention is usually too small, rela- 
tive to the total volume of outstanding debt, to 
have a significant impact on portfolio choices. 
With the publicly held federal debt in excess of 
$1.5 trillion, U.S. intervention probably would 
need to be massive before the cumulative volume 
had significant impact on portfolio decisions.15 
C.  The Expectations Channel 
&change-market intervention also could alter 
exchange rates if  it changed expectations in the  9 
foreign-exchange markets. Most economists regard 
foreign-exchange markets as highly efficient. An 
eficient market is one that "fully reflects" all 
relevant, available information about today's 
events as well as about all predictable future 
events, including policy decisions (see Fama, 
[I9701  ).I6  An implication of  this is that exchange 
rates respond to unanticipated events or "news." 
When the exchange market and other markets are 
efficient, transactions based on observed exchange 
rates ensure the optimal allocation of resources. 
While exchange markets are highly 
efficient, they probably are not perfectly efficient. 
Tests of market efficiency generally search for 
unusual profits !tom arbitrage or trading rules. In 
an efficient market, unusual profits should not 
exist; their existence would imply that certain 
transactors consistently have better information 
than others. Although these tests generally are 
1  15 
Batten and Ott (1984) make a similar argument, which does 
not result from a portfolio model, noting that the average 
daily volume of  funds flowing through the exchange market is quite large 
relative to the typical volume of intervention. 
16 
Levich (1983) writes the spot rate, S, as: 
St =  Z1 
+
  PIE(Sl +  1)  -  S1l, 
where Z,  is a collection of  contemporaneous variables that explain S,. 
Collecting terms and substituting repeatedly for lagged values: 
st  =  (l+P).' :  (~11-Plk  E(zl.k). 
k-1 
Hence, the spot exchange rate depends on current expectations of  the 
relevant 'Yundamentals" in Z from the present to the indefinite future. 
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inconclusive, they have raised serious doubts 
about perfect exchange-market efficiency." 
In addition, casual observations 
have raised questions about whether the rnarket 
consistently uses all available information when 
setting exchange rates (see Dombusch [I9831  ). 
Many exchange-market analysts contend that the 
exchange market often focuses on one piece of in- 
formation to the exclusion of other important 
information and sometimes trades on false infor- 
mation or the wrong model. Trades on false in- 
formation can be self-fulfilling . If, for example, 
traders believe that a full moon causes dollar 
depreciation and sell during full moons, their 
expectations will be met. Such activity can lead to 
abrupt, potentially disruptive adjustments in 
exchange rates as the market changes its focus to 
a different set, or eventually to the correct set, of 
fundamentals. &change-market  analysts also 
have argued that exchange rates periodically are 
subject to speculative runs or bubbles. When 
information is incomplete, traders might rely on 
recent exchange-rate movements to indicate 
market sentiment and future movements in the 
rate. Traders may buy an appreciating currency or 
sell a depreciating currency, thereby reinforcing 
exchange rate movements. It is important to 
emphasize that most economists regard the inef- 
ficiencies in the exchange market as minor and 
as generally not contributing much to exchange- 
rate volatility. Nevertheless, to the extent that inef- 
ficiencies exist, intervention could alter exchange 
rates by altering expectations in the market. 
Most monetary authorities attempt 
to conduct intervention policy in such a way as to 
improve the information flow through the 
market; according to the  Jurgensen (1983) report: 
The authorities in each of the Summit 
countries at times undertook large-scale in- 
tervention when they judged that market 
participants had not taken full account of 
fundamental factors, [or] had only reacted 
slowly to changes in fundamentals  ... (p.21). 
There are a number of difficulties 
in implementing intervention designed to influ- 
ence market expectations.  Such intervention 
involves a judgment on the part of the monetary 
authorities that first, the current volatility in the 
market reflects inefficiencies and not adjustments 
(or expectations of adjustments) in fundamental 
determinants; and second, that the monetary 
authorities possess better information than the 
market about market developments. In the pro- 
cessing of normal information flow about real 
economic developments, prices, interest rates, or 
routine policy, there is little reason to suspect that 
.......................................... 
I  1  7 See Levich (ISB]) for a survey 
policymakers are any better informed than market 
participants. At  times, however, the Federal 
Reserve and the U.S. Treasuty could have better 
information than the market. This might occur, 
for example, when policymakers are considering 
a change in monetary or fiscal policy that differs 
from past policy reactions. The market already 
will incorporate a policy reaction function into 
the exchange-rate quotations. The need to pro- 
vide new information to the market limits the 
instances when sterilized intervention is feasible. 
A highly efficient market will inter- 
pret intervention activity quickly. Hakkio and 
Pearce (1985) found that unanticipated money- 
supply announcements had a significant effect on 
exchange rates, but that the adjustment usually oc- 
curred within twenty minutes of the announce- 
ment. One would expect the exchange-rate change 
in response to new information to be permanent. 
The decision of the Group of Five 
countries to intervene in late September of 1985 
(the Plaza decision) seems to represent a recent 
example of successful intervention that altered 
expectations in the foreign exchange markets. At 
the time, the dollar was depreciating in the 
foreign-exchange market, but the market seemed 
uncertain about the future course of monetary 
and fiscal policies. The money stock, narrowly 
defined, was growing in excess of its target range, 
suggesting that the Federal Reserve might take 
steps to reduce money growth. On the other 
hand, economic activity seemed weak at the 
time; many complained that the dollar was over- 
valued, and banks continued to experience difi- 
culties with agricultural and international loans. 
These events suggested that the Federal Reserve 
might not tighten. At the same time, there was 
increasing talk in Congress about the need to 
reduce the federal budget deficit, but little con- 
crete action. Under these circumstances, the 
market seemed to view the decision to intervene 
as a signal that U.S. policy would not move in a 
direction that might strengthen the dollar in 
exchange markets. The United States intervened 
forcefully, but did not continue to intervene 
beyond the quarter. 
A second important question con- 
cerns the appropriateness of using intervention to 
alter expectations.  Given that monetaty authorities 
can provide new information to the exchange mar- 
ket about future monetary policy and alter expec- 
tations in the market, is intervention the approp- 
riate vehicle for providing this information? 
Could the central bank provide the same informa- 
tion through the announcement of monetary pol- 
icy intentions or by providing an interpretation of 
recent events?  This issue has not received much at- 
tention in the literature on central-bank interven- 
tion. Perhaps actual currency purchases or sales 
are necessary to convince the rnarket about cen- 
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tral bank intentions because it represents a bet by 
the central bank on its own information. Profita- 
ble intervention tends to stabilize the exchange 
rate. Moreover, as Henderson (1984) notes: 
... losses on foreign exchange positions can 
lead to significant political problems for the 
authorities. Thus, if  the authorities under- 
take an intervention policy which would 
generate foreign exchange losses if their 
pronouncements about future monetary 
policy were not put into effect, there might 
be more reason for private agents to take 
these pronouncements seriously. (p. 391) 
We also should question the 
extent to which one truly can regard intervention 
that alters expectations about future monetary 
policy as being sterilized. While such intervention 
might intensify the effects of the change in mone- 
tary policy, as suggested in Jurgensen (1983, pp. 
20-21), it is clearly dependent on fulfillment of 
the expectations. 
While the expectations channel 
offers the most promise as a means of accom- 
plishing sterilized intervention, it probably is the 
most difficult channel for a central bank to navi- 
gate. It is important to emphasize that the pur- 
chase or sale of foreign exchange per se is not 
affecting the exchange rate; the critical factor is the 
information these transactions might provide. 
Such intervention must be unanticipated and 
convey new, convincing information to the 
market. Because it is difficult to determine how 
expectations are forged and how strongly they are 
carried, attempts to alter expectations through 
intervention could be very expensive. 
V.  Conclusion 
This article has discussed three channels through 
which central bank intervention could alter 
exchange rates. These are the monetary channel, 
the portfolio-balance channel, and the expecta- 
tions channel. Two broad conclusions emerge 
Ikom our review of these channels. First, changes 
in a nation's money growth relative to money 
growth abroad can have a profound effect on that 
nation's nominal exchange rates. This holds true 
whether the money stock change is engineered 
through conventional methods of monetary policy 
-open-market operations, discount-rate changes 
or reserve-ratio changes-or whether the money 
stock change is engineered through nonsterilized 
intervention in foreign exchange markets. 
Changes in a nation's monetary growth, however, 
may have only temporary effects on that nation's 
real exchange rates, especially if goods prices 
adjust slowly to changes in money growth rates. 
However, nations have been most 
interested in conducting sterilized intervention, 
that is, intervention independent of  monetary 
policy. Such intervention would allow them the 
opportunity to influence exchange rates without 
interfering with domestic monetary objectives. 
Our second conclusion is that sterilized interven- 
tion has a limited, but not necessarily insignifi- 
cant, impact on exchange rates. The portfolio- 
balance approach to exchange-rate determination 
suggests that sterilized intervention could influ- 
ence exchange rates permanently by altering the 
relative supplies of government bonds in the 
hands of the public. If wealth holders perceive 
these bonds as net wealth and as imperfect sub- 
stitutes, sterilized intervention could alter the 
exchange rate in the desired direction by chang- 
ing the risk premium on these bonds. Unfortu- 
nately, empirical investigations to date have not 
demonstrated unequivocally that a risk premium 
exists on government bonds issued by the major 
developed countries. Nor have they shown that 
intervention in the magnitudes typically under- 
taken by the major central banks is sufficiently 
large to influence the risk premiums. The expec- 
tations channel suggests that sterilized interven- 
tion can influence exchange rates by altering the 
flow of information in the exchange market. 
However, this requires that the intervening cen- 
tral bank be able to identify periods of market 
inefficiency and that it have information, for 
example, about future monetary policy, which the 
market lacks. The exchange market seems highly 
efficient, so that opportunities for the central 
bank to exploit this channel probably are not 
great. Nevertheless, under the proper conditions, 
such intervention can have an immediate and 
permanent impact on exchange rates. 
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